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Abstract 
This article critically assesses three links on how trade might harm the environment. 
First, trade liberalisation might exacerbate existing levels of resource depletion and en-
vironmental pollution. Second, open borders might allow companies to migrate to ‘pol-
lution havens’, thus undermining high environmental standards in host countries. Third, 
the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) might favour 
trade over environmental interests in case of conflict. It is shown that while trade liber-
alisation can lead to an increase in environmental degradation, pollution havens are not 
a statistically significant phenomenon. As concerns measures aimed at domestic envi-
ronmental protection, the dispute settlement in the WTO is not biased against environ-
mental interests. The relationship is more complicated with respect to measures aimed at 
extra-jurisdictional environmental protection and with respect to trade restrictions for 
health reasons under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The paper 
concludes with some constructive suggestions on how trade and the environment can be 
reconciled in future trade negotiations. 
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1. Introduction 
Many environmentalists are critical towards trade liberalisation. In their view, free trade 
is responsible for many aspects of environmental degradation and for the failure of pol-
icy makers to adequately protect the environment. This critique cannot leave uncon-
cerned those who both care for the environment and believe in a liberal world trading 
order. This article attempts to demonstrate that while there is indeed reason for being 
concerned about the environmental consequences of free trade, environmental protec-
tion and trade liberalisation need not clash with each other. It provides some suggestions 
on how trade and environmental protection can be reconciled in future rounds of trade 
negotiations. 
The criticism of environmental activists and ecologically oriented academics towards 
trade liberalisation can be summarised in three points (see, for example, Greenpeace 
1997, WWF et al. 1998, WWF 1999, FoE 1999a, Morris 1990, Daly 1993, Lang and 
Hines 1993, McGinn 1998): 
• The liberalisation of trade is likely to exacerbate the existing high levels of environ-
mental degradation. 
• Countries will lower their environmental standards in order to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into ‘pollution havens’ if trade liberalisation allows them to export 
their goods into countries with high environmental standards. 
• The dispute settlement system of the WTO favours trade interests over environmental 
protection. 
In this paper, I will critically assess what theory and empirical evidence can tell us with 




2. Environmental degradation due to trade liberalisation 
From an outside perspective, it might seem at times as if economists and free trade pro-
ponents unreservedly subscribed to the view that trade liberalisation is always in har-
mony with the environment. Such a perspective would be fundamentally wrong, how-
ever. First, there is a consensus among economists that trade liberalisation might harm 
the environment if the environment is not optimally managed. If externalities are not 
internalised, then free trade can make the already inefficient allocation of resources even 
more inefficient. In these circumstances, trade liberalisation can be like a fresh breeze of 
wind on a house that is already set on fire. Even the WTO (1997b, p. 1) readily admits 
that for the benefits of trade liberalisation to be realised and ‘for trade-induced growth to 
be sustainable, appropriate environmental policies determined at the national level need 
to be put in place’. What is more, if an economy that is liberalising its trade regime suf-
fers from distortions to a great extent, an increase in trade can very well harm the coun-
try’s overall welfare, not just its environmental quality (Markandya 1994, p. 10). 
Second, there exist both theoretical economic models and empirical evidence sug-
gesting that trade liberalisation might harm the environment even if resources are effi-
ciently allocated and the environment is optimally managed. At the most fundamental 
level, it is uncontested that if a country specialises in the production of pollution-
intensive goods after an opening up towards trade, its emissions will rise and its envi-
ronment will suffer. On the other hand, the other countries will become cleaner and their 
environment will benefit as they can satisfy their demand for pollution-intensive goods 
via increased imports (Rauscher 1991, p. 20f.), so that the overall amount of pollution 
need not increase. In other models, however, a global increase in pollution follows from 
trade liberalisation. In the two regions model of Copeland and Taylor (1994), for exam-
ple, worldwide pollution increases even though emissions in the ‘North’ decrease be-
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cause ‘Southern’ emissions increase even more. Behind this result stands the assump-
tion — widely shared among economists — that the environment is a normal good. This 
means that demand for environmental protection increases with income growth. It fol-
lows that trade liberalisation which shifts the production of pollution-intensive goods 
towards the low-income, high-polluting South increases global pollution as the decrease 
in Northern emissions is insufficient at the margin to compensate for the increase in 
Southern emissions.1 
Third, the negative worldwide environmental effects of trade liberalisation described 
above become exacerbated if one of two conditions hold: first pollution is not local, but 
transboundary or global in nature and second, the environment is not optimally man-
aged. In the first case, incentives to internalise the environmental externality are low, the 
most conspicuous example being greenhouse gases. In the second case, trade liberalisa-
tion can lead to an export of the resource misallocation to other countries and thereby to 
a deterioration in environmental quality. An example for this is Chichilnisky’s (1994) 
influential two regions model in which ill defined property rights over natural resources 
in the South lead to an overproduction of environmentally intensive goods. The South 
has a comparative advantage in the production of this good — an advantage that is only 
apparent, however. Trade liberalisation ‘makes things worse, in the sense that the over-
use of the resource increases as the South moves from autarky to trade’ (ibid., p. 859). A 
final aspect of how trade liberalisation can harm the environment is via the increase in 
transportation. OECD (1997b) estimates that international transport is bound to increase 
by four to five per cent due to the increase in trade in the wake of the Uruguay Round. 
That trade liberalisation can lead to worldwide environmental degradation is not an 
artefact of theoretical economic models. The empirical study by Cole, Rayner and Bates 
(1998) on the environmental effects of the Uruguay Round demonstrates that global 
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emissions of nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, suspended particulate 
matter and carbon dioxide are likely to have increased. Their study mirrors the finding 
from theoretical models that emission increases in the developing South overcompen-
sate for possible emission decreases in the developed North. What the study demon-
strates as well, however, is that the monetary value of the increased environmental dam-
age is likely to be drastically lower than the welfare gain due to the other beneficial ef-
fects of trade liberalisation. This result echoes the theoretical finding of Anderson 
(1992, p. 29) that overall welfare is unambiguously higher with trade if environmental 
policy is not too far from its optimum ‘despite the fact that the environment is more pol-
luted’. 
To sum up, both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence show that trade liber-
alisation can lead to a global increase in resource depletion and to a global increase in 
environmental pollution. These effects are more likely to occur and are more likely to be 
stronger if property rights over resources are ill defined and if the environment is not 
optimally managed. There is ample evidence that, especially in many developing, but 
also in developed countries, environmental management is non-optimal and property 
rights over natural resources are ill defined (see, for example, World Bank 1992). As 
concerns the so-called global commons (climate, biodiversity etc.), property rights are 
practically non-existent and open access prevails leading to excessive resource depletion 
and pollution. The first concern of environmentalists is therefore well supported by 
theoretical models and empirical evidence: trade liberalisation can indeed exacerbate the 
existing high levels of environmental degradation. 
This finding does not imply that overall welfare must fall if environmental degrada-
tion increases. Indeed, as argued above, overall welfare can well increase if environ-
mental management and resource depletion are not too far from their optimum. Two 
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important observations follow: First, because trade liberalisation can lead to both overall 
welfare improvements and a deterioration of environmental quality, a fundamental clash 
can arise between free trade proponents and environmentalists. While the former can 
refer to the overall increase in welfare in justification for their calls for trade liberalisa-
tion, the environmentalists are likely to refer to increased resource depletion and envi-
ronmental degradation in justification for their concern about or opposition to trade lib-
eralisation. This clash is often not clearly recognised and it is not easily ameliorated. 
Second, the increase in environmental degradation could in principle overcompensate 
any other beneficial effect of trade liberalisation. In other words, a situation in which 
environmental degradation increases so much that overall welfare decreases cannot be 
ruled out per se. It is largely an empirical matter and would call for a careful assessment 
of the environmental consequences of trade liberalisation. 
 
 
3. Pollution havens: Do developing countries lower their environmental standards to 
attract foreign investment? 
The second fear that environmentalists share is that countries supposedly have an incen-
tive to artificially lower their environmental standards in order to attract FDI from high-
standard countries into their so-called ‘pollution havens’. Trade liberalisation comes 
into play in so far as a freer trade regime allows the exportation of goods into the coun-
tries with the higher standards. From the environmentalists’ perspective this is detrimen-
tal for two reasons. First, the environment in the pollution havens deteriorates substan-
tially. Second comes a ‘chilling effect’ on environmental regulation such that countries 
fear to raise standards because of the threat of capital outflow that higher standards 
might induce. Worse still, capital outflows might actually put downward pressure on 
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existing environmental standards of the source countries: countries compete with each 
other in a ‘race to the bottom’ with respect to environmental standards in order to attract 
or keep capital. In the words of Daly (1993, p. 26f.): ‘...unrestricted trade imposes lower 
standards’. 
There are two basic strands of economic theory that can give rise to results similar to 
the ones just described. For one strand, Oates and Schwab (1988) can serve as the prime 
model. If capital is internationally mobile and if countries want to acquire capital in or-
der to gain capital tax revenue, then countries have an incentive to set their environ-
mental standards below the optimal level in order to attract migratory capital. This result 
mirrors in the field of environmental standards a more general and much older finding 
from the literature on international tax competition. Similarly, pollution havens can arise 
if some countries fail to internalise all environmental externalities because the environ-
mental pollution in question is transboundary, because policy makers are biased against 
environmental concerns or because of political-institutional failures in low standards 
countries (Neumayer 2000). 
For the other strand of economic theory, Barrett (1994) is presumably the best known 
model. He shows that if international markets are imperfectly competitive, then coun-
tries can have an incentive to lower their environmental standards, which allows the 
home country’s industry to expand its output and to shift some of the profits from inter-
national markets away from its foreign country’s competitors.2 Since all countries have 
this incentive, environmental standards are set inefficiently low worldwide. This result 
mirrors the more general and much older finding from the literature on research and 
development as well as export subsidies as a means to reap profits from international 
imperfectly competitive markets. Indeed, because lower environmental standards also 
hurt a country because of an increase in domestic pollution, they are only second best to 
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subsidies. But if R&D or export subsidies become incriminated by international trade 
agreements like the WTO, then to lower environmental standards can become the best 
instrument available. 
The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that countries lower their en-
vironmental standards and industries migrate towards low standard countries, however. 
Practically all studies agree that apart from some specific cases there is no general de-
tectable evidence that pollution havens are a significant phenomenon (see, for example, 
Leonard 1988; Tobey 1990; Jaffe, Peterson and Stavins 1995; OECD 1997a; Zarsky 
1999). While it is true that pollution intensity as a share of total manufacturing output 
has increased in the developing world, whereas it has decreased in developed countries 
(see Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige 1992 and Mani and Wheeler 1997), this trend cannot 
be attributed to pollution havens as the consumption of pollution intensive goods in the 
developed world has decreased hand in hand so that the ‘consumption/production ratios 
for dirty-sector products in the developing world have remained close to unity’ (Mani 
and Wheeler 1997, p. 20). There are manifold reasons why transnational corporations do 
not migrate towards countries with low environmental standards. These reasons range 
from the fear of liability in case of accidents, risk to a multinational corporation’s repu-
tation, consumer demands for environmentally friendly production to the costs of un-
bundling technology and the anticipation of future more stringent environmental regula-
tion in the host country (Neumayer 2000). 
The reader should note two important caveats, however. The first caveat is that most 
empirical studies have so far looked at whether pollution prevention expenditures have 
prompted manufacturing industries to move to other locations with laxer environmental 
protection standards. Much less attention has been given to an examination of whether 
natural resource exploiting industries, from forest logging companies to open cast min-
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ing, have relocated to places with less strict standards or have successfully used the 
threat of re-location to knock down the imposition of stricter standards.3 More attention 
seems warranted here for mainly two reasons: first, natural resource and environmental 
protection policies can lead to substantial costs for resource exploiting industries, thus 
strengthening the incentives for re-location. For example, the costs for logging compa-
nies are significantly different depending on whether or not they are required to use a 
forest sustainably. Second, natural resource exploitation can have tremendous environ-
mental consequences if adequate environmental standards are not in place. For example, 
open cast mining can lead to substantial pollution problems and disturbance of natural 
eco-systems if standards for pollution containment and re-cultivation are not existent or 
are not enforced. 
The second caveat to keep in mind is that environmental protection expenditures 
have been relatively small so far as a share of overall costs. Up to a certain threshold, 
these costs can increase without causing any major re-location. If these were to rise be-
yond a certain threshold, however, cost incentives for re-location could become domi-
nant. That is, the decision to re-locate could be non-linear in costs, which would be real-
istic for sectors of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (for an eco-
nomic model with these characteristics, see Markusen, Morey and Olewiler 1995). 
 
 
4. WTO dispute settlement: trade above the environment? 
The third critique of the environmentalists is that trade always supersedes environmental 
interests in the WTO’s dispute settlement system – as it did before in the GATT. As 
Retallack (1997) has put it: ‘[I]n every case brought before it to date, the WTO has ruled 
in favour of corporate interest, striking down national and sub-national legislation pro-
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tecting the environment and public health at every turn.’ In some sense, this is the envi-
ronmentalists’ major critique against the WTO. Because, according to their perspective, 
trade liberalisation leads to more environmental degradation, sovereign nation states 
should at least have the right to impose stringent regulation to mitigate these environ-
mentally detrimental effects — even if it interferes with trade interests. Indeed, because 
trade liberalisation induces countries to lower their environmental standards to keep 
existing or attract new capital, judged from the environmentalists’ view stringent regula-
tion is only possible if it restricts trade. It is therefore worthwhile to take a closer look at 
the most important disputes where countries justified policies with one of the environ-
mental exceptions in Article XX of the GATT, whereas other GATT or WTO members 
regarded those policies as violating their trade rights and therefore brought them before 
a panel to decide. It is important to distinguish between measures, which aim at the pro-
tection of the domestic environment, and measures, which aim at the protection of the 
environment outside a country’s jurisdiction. However, it will also be important to look 
at the European Union import ban of beef from hormone treated cattle. This ban was not 
justified under one of the exceptions in Article XX of the GATT, but under human 
health protection provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which forms part of the WTO system. 
 
4.1 Measures aimed at domestic environmental protection 
As concerns trade restrictions, which aim at the protection of the domestic environment, 
there have been four major decisions so far. All of them ended with the dispute panel (or 
the appellate body, respectively) ruling that the trade restriction was, partially at least, in 
non-conformity with GATT/WTO rules. However, in every decision each dispute panel 
has stressed that it had not decided against the protection of the domestic environment, 
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but merely against the intended or unintended effects of domestic regulation on imports 
from trading partners. In all cases, the panel has shown ways on how to protect the do-
mestic environment without interfering with the trade rights of foreign countries. Let us 
have a closer look at these dispute settlement decisions. 
In November 1987 a panel decided on Canada’s export prohibitions of unprocessed 
salmon and herring (GATT 1987). Canada argued that these were necessary to protect 
its fish stocks that it said were under threat of depletion. The panel ruled that Canada 
had violated its GATT obligations and demanded that Canada brings its measures into 
conformity with the GATT. It is important to note, however, that the panel did not ques-
tion Canada’s fundamental right to put policies in place that protect its fish stocks. It 
merely ruled against Canada because it found that the export prohibitions were not ‘pri-
marily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as 
“relating to“ conservation with the meaning of Article XX(g)’ of the GATT (ibid., para. 
4.6), which excepts measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption’. First, Canada did not prohibit the export of processed 
salmon and herring, thus not generally limiting the exploitation of its fish stocks. Sec-
ond, Canada did not restrict access of its domestic producers to its unprocessed fish, 
thus effectively discriminating against foreign processors and privileging domestic ones 
(ibid., para 4.7). It is therefore most doubtful that Canada’s export prohibitions of un-
processed salmon and herring were only motivated by genuine concern about the protec-
tion of these fish stocks. Because restrictions only applied to foreign producers, not to 
domestic ones, there is some reason for suspecting that the regulation served to disguise 
protectionist intentions. At the very least, one can say that Canada tried to protect its 
salmon and herring stocks entirely at the expense of foreign producers. The dispute 
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panel objected to this, but it did not rule against a regulation, which would protect the 
fish stocks more generally and would affect domestic and foreign producers alike. 
In October 1990 a panel ruled against Thailand’s restrictions on the importation of 
foreign cigarettes and its higher taxes on imported as opposed to domestically produced 
cigarettes (GATT 1990). Thailand had justified its policies with health protection. The 
panel ruled that because smoking constitutes a serious risk to human health ‘measures 
designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b)’ 
(ibid., para. 73), which excepts measures that are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health’. The panel stated ‘that this provision clearly allowed contracting 
parties to give priority to human health over trade liberalization’ (ibid.). In order ‘for a 
measure to be covered by Article XX(b) it had to be “necessary“’ to protect human life 
or health, however (ibid.). It went on in interpreting ‘necessary’ in the sense that ‘there 
were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent 
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health 
policy objectives’ (ibid., para. 75). The panel suggested a whole range of possible re-
strictions on the sale and purchase of cigarettes that Thailand might have employed 
without violating the rights of foreign cigarette producers. In the end, it ruled against 
Thailand because its measure treated foreign cigarettes less favourably than domestic 
ones without this trade discrimination being necessary to achieve its health objectives. 
In September 1994, a panel decided on several United States measures on automo-
biles: a luxury tax on cars sold for over $30,000, a gas guzzler tax, which applied to 
automobiles in general, and the so-called Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
regulation (GATT 1994). The panel found the two taxes to be consistent, but the CAFE 
regulation to be inconsistent with GATT regulations. This measure required the average 
fuel economy per fleet of automobiles for cars manufactured in the United States or sold 
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by any importer not to exceed 27.5 miles per gallon. The panel did not find the fuel 
economy regulation as such to be inconsistent with GATT. It merely objected against a 
provision within the regulation, which required companies that both manufacture cars 
domestically and import cars from abroad to exceed this fuel economy minimum sepa-
rately for both the domestically manufactured and the imported cars. 
In April 1996, an appellate body overruled an earlier panel report concerning US 
regulation of fuels and fuel additives (WTO 1996b). The regulation was quite compli-
cated, but in essence required refiners to supply cleaner fuels and fuel additives relative 
to 1990 baseline standards. However, whereas US refiners were allowed to invoke their 
individual 1990 baselines, foreign refiners in effect where faced with statutory baselines 
reflecting average 1990 US gasoline quality (ibid., pp. 4-6). The appellate body came to 
the conclusion that the baseline establishment rules fell within the terms of Article 
XX(g), thus effectively ruling that stricter regulations on the pollution impact of fuels 
and fuel additives are in accordance with GATT (ibid., pp. 13-21). It went on analysing 
whether it was also covered by the chapeau of Article XX which states that measures 
that fall under one of the environmental exceptions must not be ‘applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade’. It ruled that the US regulation violated this requirement stating that the US could 
have made individual baselines available to foreign refiners as well, thus avoiding dis-
crimination against them (ibid., p. 25). It was not convinced by the US objection that 
individual baselines for foreign refiners would have generated insurmountable adminis-
trative problems saying that the US had failed to engage in serious efforts to achieve 
cooperative agreements with the home countries of foreign refiners to reduce these 
costs. As with the decision on Canada’s export prohibition of unprocessed salmon an 
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herring, the appellate body on US regulation of fuels and fuel additives clearly did not 
rule against the rights of the US to impose regulation in order to make cleaner fuels and 
fuel additives compulsory. It merely demanded that foreign and domestic suppliers of 
these fuels and fuel additives were treated on equal terms in allowing individual 1990 
baseline standards. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has now agreed 
to evaluate foreign refiners on their individual baselines for minimum clean air stan-
dards as well, in order to remove the unequal treatment and to comply with the WTO 
ruling (ICTSD 1999d). 
 
4.2 Measures aimed at extra-jurisdictional environmental protection 
As concerns trade restrictions, which aim at environmental protection outside a coun-
try’s jurisdictions, there have been two major decisions by trade panels and appellate 
bodies, respectively. 
In August 1991 a panel ruled on the by now famous case of US import restrictions of 
tuna that was caught with fishing technology which resulted in the incidental killing of 
dolphins in excess of the killing rate of US fishing vessels (GATT 1993). The funda-
mental question to be decided was whether the US had the right to invoke Article XX(b) 
of the GATT to regulate production methods outside its own jurisdiction. While it was 
at pains to assure that ‘the provisions of the General Agreement impose few constraints 
on a contracting party’s implementation of domestic environmental policies’ (ibid., para. 
6.2), the panel was equally clear in ruling against the permissibility of extra-
jurisdictional regulation. It argued that otherwise ‘each contracting party could unilater-
ally determine the life or health protection policies from which other contracting parties 
could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement’ (ibid., 
para. 5.27). Similarly, with respect to Article XX(g) of the GATT, the panel ruled that ‘a 
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country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible natural 
resource only to the extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction’ 
(ibid., para. 5.31). 
In the possibly most important ruling so far, an appellate body in October 1998 over-
ruled an earlier panel report concerning US import prohibition of certain shrimp and 
shrimp products (WTO 1998b). In essence, the US had prohibited the importation of 
these products from countries that were not certified by the US as employing harvesting 
methods which prevented the incidental killing of five species of sea turtles. The earlier 
panel had found that the US regulation would ‘undermine the WTO multilateral trading 
system’ and could thus not be permitted under Article XX of the GATT (WTO 1998a, 
para. 7.44 and 7.62). If this ruling had passed the appeal to the appellate body, it would 
have confirmed the environmentalists’ worst expectations that under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement trade always trumps the environment in case of conflict. The appellate body, 
however, fully rejected this finding noting that to maintain the multilateral trading sys-
tem ‘is not a right or an obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule which can be em-
ployed in the appraisal of a given measure under the chapeau of Article XX’ (WTO 
1998b, para. 116). It went on saying that the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ from 
Article XX(g) should be interpreted not according to its meaning at the time of drafting 
the GATT agreement more than 50 years ago, but ‘in the light of contemporary con-
cerns’ citing the preamble of the WTO Agreement which embraces ‘the objective of 
sustainable development’ (ibid., para. 129). It should thus be interpreted as encompass-
ing not only mineral natural resources, but also living species. 
The appellate body then went on examining whether the US import ban violated the 
chapeau of Article XX. It ruled that the ban amounted to an ‘unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail’ stating that the ‘most conspicuous 
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flaw in this measure’s application relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on the 
specific policy decisions made by foreign governments (...) to adopt essentially the same 
policy (together with an approved enforcement program) as that applied to, and enforced 
on, United States domestic shrimp trawlers.’ (ibid., para. 161). Further, it noted that the 
ban also affected ‘shrimp caught using methods identical to those employed in the 
United States (...) solely because they have been caught in waters of countries that have 
not been certified by the United States’ (ibid., para. 165). The panel further pointed out 
that while the US had negotiated and concluded the Inter-American Convention as a 
regional international agreement for the protection of sea turtles, no serious efforts were 
undertaken to negotiate similar agreements with the appellant countries India, Pakistan, 
Thailand and Malaysia. Due to this and some other aspects of the regulation, the panel 
judged that the regulation ‘imposes a single, rigid and unbending requirement that coun-
tries applying for certification (...) adopt a comprehensive regulatory programme that is 
essentially the same as the United States’ program, without inquiring into the appropri-
ateness of that program for the conditions prevailing in the exporting countries’ (ibid., 
para. 177). The appellate body also ruled that the US import ban amounted to ‘arbitrary 
discrimination’ as it found that the ‘certification processes followed by the United States 
(...) appear to be singularly informal and casual’ so that foreign countries could not be 
certain that they were ‘applied in a fair and just manner’ (ibid., para. 181). 
In sum, the appellate body ruled against the way the US imposed its own regulatory 
standards upon foreign companies, but it did not rule against a need for protection for 
sea turtles. Indeed, the body reserved a full paragraph to emphasise this point: 
 
We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no sig-
nificance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sover-
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eign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect 
endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not 
decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilat-
erally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species 
or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do. (ibid., para. 185) 
 
Interestingly, the appellate body did not refer to the panel report concerning US im-
port restrictions of tuna in its ruling. In effect, it did not uphold the principle, enshrined 
in the earlier tuna-decision, that the US was prohibited from regulating production 
methods for shrimp harvesting outside its own jurisdiction in order to protect sea turtles 
per se. This is the more important as the tuna panel report was never adopted by GATT 
or WTO, because Mexico, the complaining country, did not find it politically opportune 
to request adoption of the ruling by the GATT council at the time of the then still ongo-
ing negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The appellate 
body in the shrimp-case thus opened the theoretical possibility for extra-jurisdictional 
environmental regulation to be consistent with WTO rules. It seems fair to say, how-
ever, that at the same time it put up so many conditions, which such a regulation would 
need to fulfil, that in practice it would be quite difficult for extra-jurisdictional unilateral 
environmental regulation to pass scrutiny.4 In the shrimp-case, the US would have had 
to engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with shrimp harvesting countries 
(ibid., para. 166). Only if these had proven to be unsuccessful could the US have intro-
duced unilateral measures. These unilateral measures would have needed to be designed 
such that differing conditions in different countries are taken into account (ibid., para. 
163-165), that all countries are granted the same ‘phase-in’ periods (ibid., para. 174), 
that the US undertakes the same effort in transferring sea turtle save harvesting technol-
ogy to all relevant parties (ibid., para. 175), and that the certification process is transpar-
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ent and allows affected countries to be heard and to appeal against non-certification 
(ibid., para. 180). 
As an alternative to unilateral extra-jurisdictional regulation, the appellate body 
strongly calls for multilateral environmental agreements for the protection of endan-
gered species. In response to the appellate body report, the United States is now consid-
ering both allowing shrimp imports from non-certified countries on a shipment-by-
shipment basis if it can be proven that the shrimps have been caught without damage to 
sea turtles and engaging in negotiations for a regional treaty to protect sea turtles similar 
to the Inter-American Convention, which would include the four complainant countries 
(ICTSD 1999b). United States environmental NGOs are unsatisfied with this response, 
however, and have already successfully challenged the shipment-by-shipment device 
before the U.S. Court of International Trade (ibid.). 
 
4.3 Trade restrictions for health reasons under the SPS Agreement 
As concerns trade restrictions for health reasons, the major decision so far has been the 
by now famous so-called ‘beef hormones’ dispute. In January 1998 an appellate body 
overruled an earlier panel report on EC measures concerning meat and meat products 
(hormones) (WTO 1998c). The US and Canada had challenged the European Communi-
ties (EC) import ban on beef from cattle raised with growth hormones. The appellate 
body in principle upheld the earlier panel ruling that the import ban violated provisions 
of Article 5 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures (SPS Agreement), which forms part of the WTO system. As the panel did before, 
the appellate body ruled that the EC had not provided sufficient evidence in the form of 
a risk assessment to justify the import ban. In two other important aspects it overruled 
the earlier panel decision, however. First, it overruled the panel’s finding that the prima 
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facie burden of proof to demonstrate that the measures related to hormones are based on 
a risk assessment rests with the party imposing an SPS measure. Instead, it ruled that the 
party challenging the measures needs to demonstrate that they are not based on a risk 
assessment (ibid., footnote 180 and para. 253a). Second, the appellate body made clear 
that a risk assessment need not establish a minimum quantifiable magnitude of risk and 
that such an assessment need not be confined to quantifiable risks (ibid., para. 253j). In 
response to this ruling, the EC has commissioned studies aiming at providing a risk as-
sessment for justifying its continued import ban (ICTSD 1999a, p. 10). At the time of 
writing, it was not clear how this conflict would be resolved. It remains to be seen how 
stringent the requirements on WTO-compatible risk assessments will be in order to jus-
tify higher food safety norms than those warranted by international standards. Article 
5.7 of the SPS Agreement enshrines the precautionary principle, which says that preven-
tive steps can be undertaken before definite scientific evidence is established, but sub-
jects it to being provisionally and subject to a ‘more objective assessment of risk’.5 
There is a need for strengthening and clarifying the role of the precautionary principle in 
the WTO system. This will be the more important as future trade disputes about geneti-
cally modified organisms are already looming at the horizon. We will come back to this 
important question of the relationship between the precautionary principle and the WTO 
system further below in the next, concluding section. 
 
5. In way of conclusion: Some suggestions for new rounds of trade negotiations 
If trade liberalisation can lead to increased environmental degradation, then the first 
important thing is to be aware of what kind of degradation is caused by what factors 
exactly. Canada, the US and the EU are now committed to a comprehensive study of the 
environmental and sustainable development impacts of any potential new round of trade 
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negotiations (DFAIT 1999; White House 1999; Kirkpatrick and Lee 1999). Environ-
mental NGOs should welcome this initiative and try to impact upon the scope and de-
sign of these and similar studies (as a first step, see WWF 1999a). Once the likely links 
between trade liberalisation and environmental degradation are established, the NGOs 
should try to use their influence to bring about adequate policies that can mitigate if not 
prevent environmental degradation. They must press for a strong message to WTO 
members that optimal environmental management needs to be in place if trade liberali-
sation is to be reconciled with environmental protection. As steps toward this, officials 
from national environmental ministries and relevant inter-governmental institutions 
should participate at certain stages in the trade negotiations (WWF 1999b, p. 3). Also, 
regular environmental assessments of the effects of trade agreements should be agreed 
upon. 
The likelihood of success for such a strategy is heightened if NGOs also press for 
trade liberalisations that can actually have positive environmental effects if accompa-
nied by adequate policies — for example, in agriculture, the energy and fisheries sector 
(see WTO 1997). NGOs could find strong support among free trade proponents for the 
removal of obstacles in the trade of environmental goods and services and for the grad-
ual abolition of many subsidies that are both economically distorting and environmen-
tally destructive (OECD 1998, de Moor 1999). In this respect, it is encouraging to see 
that in the US, Friends of the Earth, Taxpayers for Common Sense and the US Public 
Interest Research Group join together in the ‘Green Scissors Campaign’ with the aim of 
cutting wasteful and environmentally harmful spending (FoE 1999b). 
The WTO has recently become much more open towards environmental and other 
NGOs, organising regular meetings and a high level symposium, derestricting the access 
to many official documents and installing a site for NGOs on its webpage (for a sum-
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mary of these activities see WTO 1999, pp. 32-34). Environmental NGOs could press 
for a further derestriction of, say, dispute panel submissions and for panel hearings to 
take place in public rather than behind closed doors. They have won one battle already 
when, against the explicit demand of developing countries (ICTSD 1998, p. 8), the ap-
pellate body in the shrimp case ruled that panels are allowed to take into account state-
ments from NGOs, so-called amicus curiae briefs, that are not part of one party’s solic-
ited submission (WTO 1998b, para. 108). The more open-minded representatives of the 
trade community clearly regard involvement of and approval by environmental NGOs as 
desirable which increases the chance that NGOs can strengthen their influence in future 
trade negotiations (see, for example, Sampson 1999). Indeed, they might have to com-
promise quite substantially and accommodate demands by NGOs, if the new round of 
trade negotiations is to be successful. In the case of the failed negotiations on a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment (MAI) environmental and other NGOs have clearly dem-
onstrated how important they can be in bringing down agreements that they fundamen-
tally oppose (see Neumayer 1999b). 
On the other hand, environmentalists should not, as Daly (1993, p. 26) does, press for 
tariffs that supposedly compensate for international differences in environmental regula-
tion. As argued above in section 3, ‘ecological dumping’ and pollution havens have not 
been proven to be statistically significant phenomena. Pressing for environmental tariffs 
will boost the protectionist factions in the developed world, but will completely alienate 
the developing countries from the environmental case. If environmentalists call for envi-
ronmental tariffs, they will soon find themselves in an unholy alliance with all sorts of 
protectionist factions, who welcome the call for tariffs for less idealistic reasons 
(DeSombre 1995).6 
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If environmentalists are particularly concerned about the environmental record of 
multinational corporations, then they should demand from host countries that they re-
quire their companies investing abroad to apply the same environmental standards as in 
the home country. However, in the end differences in environmental standards are partly 
the consequence of differences in both the absorptive capacity of differing environments 
and, more importantly, of differing policy priorities. They need not have anything to do 
with a deliberate attempt to attract dirty industries from developed countries. 
Environmental NGOs should try to gain support for their case from developing coun-
tries, which are so far positively hostile to virtually any form of ‘greening’ of trade is-
sues (see, for example, Shahin 1997, Lal Das 1998, and the comments by developing 
country delegates in a high-level WTO symposium on trade and the environment as 
documented in ICTSD 1999c). For them economic development and poverty alleviation 
take clear priority over environmental protection and they fear that their development is 
burdened with environmental obligations and their market access to developed countries 
is restricted under what they regard as flimsy environmental pretexts. As Das (1993, p. 
356) has put it bluntly: ‘There is a contemporary movement of idealists in the West — 
the global environmentalists — who might trigger another round of imperialism in the 
name of saving spaceship Earth’. Such fears might not do justice to most environmental 
NGOs, who often care about the fate of people in developing countries immensely and 
share many of the demands of developing countries to make the world trading system 
more favourable to them. However, the tensions are existent and environmental NGOs 
will find it helpful to alleviate them. One way to do this is for NGOs to press for the 
design of environmental measures in a way that they do not represent barriers to market 
access for developing countries. Many of these fear that they do not have adequate in-
formation and capacity to comply with, for example, ecolabels, which mainly affect 
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goods such as textiles, leather, footwear, forestry and food products that developing 
countries have a comparative advantage in producing and exporting (WTO 1996a). 
As concerns the settlement of disputes, no changes to Article XX of GATT seem 
warranted as far as measures are concerned, which aim at domestic environmental pro-
tection. WTO members have ample leeway to formulate strong domestic environmental 
policies in a way that the trading rights of other members are not violated. In the cases 
decided by panels so far, measures were only found inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules 
because different regulations applied to foreign producers. In each case, the regulation 
could be easily amended to treat foreign and domestic producers alike without jeopard-
ising in any respect the objective of environmental protection. 
Things are far less clear with respect to measures, which aim at extra-jurisdictional 
environmental protection. While the appellate body in the shrimp case has in principle 
not decided against the possibility of such regulation, it has also set up many hurdles, 
which would be difficult to get over in practice. Environmentalists are generally in fa-
vour of unilateral regulation of production methods outside a country’s own jurisdiction, 
if only as a measure of last resort (see, for example, von Moltke 1997, WWF et al. 1998, 
WWF 1999b). This is quite understandable as it would often seem to be the most direct 
way to undertake steps for the protection of endangered species abroad — with immedi-
ate impact upon those who threaten the species and so much more easier to achieve than 
tedious negotiations for an international agreement. And yet, unilateral measures aimed 
at extra-jurisdictional environmental protection might do more harm than good, even for 
the environmentalists’ case. It would represent a falling back into a world where power 
dominates rules in solving international conflicts and the stronger countries unilaterally 
prescribe the weaker ones what they have to do, which is exactly why developing coun-
tries are unambiguous in their united opposition (see ICTSD 1999c). It would be a world 
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in which every country can try to impose its particular value system on others, but only 
the powerful ones succeed. Such actions would run counter to the spirit of cooperation 
which the world is so dire in need for the solving of international and global environ-
mental problems. 
There is a dilemma then: On the one hand, unilateral action is undesirable for the rea-
sons mentioned above; on the other hand, multilateral action is difficult to bring about, 
often takes time and might very well be insufficient. As all real dilemmas, there is no 
easy solution. My personal view is that as long as it has not been convincingly shown 
that attempts for multilateral environmental agreements are doomed to failure, WTO 
members should not have resort to unilateral measures aimed at extra-jurisdictional en-
vironmental protection. However, WTO members should support the establishment of 
multilateral environmental agreements then and should ensure that the WTO does not 
stand in the way of effective multilateral agreements. This is because even if unilateral 
measures are ruled out, trade restrictions have a clear role to play in promoting envi-
ronmental cooperation, as they can play a vital role as a self-enforcement device in in-
ternational environmental treaties and to contain free-riding (Neumayer 1999a). The 
difference is that in these cases sanctions are authorised by multilateral agreement and 
are not unilaterally imposed on others. There needs to be clarification that trade restric-
tions in these multilateral environmental agreements cannot be challenged under the 
WTO dispute settlement — again, a task for environmental NGOs to press for in the 
next round of trade negotiations. So far, no country has tried to challenge the trade re-
strictions in the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer or the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). But there is hardly any 
doubt that a potential for clash of rules exists, so clarification is important. 
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Another mechanism, which can help to achieve species protection (and animal wel-
fare protection more generally), is via mandatory eco-labelling. The idea is to let con-
sumers decide whether, to give two examples, they prefer shrimp caught with turtle safe 
devices or fur from animals caught without leghold traps. So far, Article III of the 
GATT, which states that ‘like products’ must not be treated differently, is likely to clash 
with eco-labelling that refers to non-product related process and production methods. 
The same is true for ecolabels for consumer goods based on ecological life-cycle as-
sessments. A decision needs be taken at the WTO that such ecolabels are regarded as 
consistent with WTO rules and do not represent non-tariff or technical barriers to trade. 
Yet another aspect on which clarification is important is with reference to the precau-
tionary principle and food safety standards. Environmental NGOs should press for a 
clarification of the SPS Agreement such that it becomes clear that, in accordance with 
the precautionary principle, countries can introduce higher than international standards 
without conclusive scientific evidence being available. The appellate body in the case of 
EC import ban on beef from cattle raised with growth hormones noted that ‘the Panel 
itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary 
principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the 
field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation’ (WTO 
1998c, para. 123). It should be clarified that a dispute panel should only have the right to 
rule against a measure taken under the SPS Agreement if it comes to the conclusion that 
the scientific evidence provided is clearly inadequate to establish health risks. It should 
not have the right to determine the level of precaution itself a WTO member country is 
allowed to apply. In a world of uncertainty and ignorance science itself cannot prescribe 
the ‘right’ level of precaution necessary to avoid potential harm (Neumayer 1999c, 
chapter 4). Here as well as in many other cases mentioned above, environmental NGOs 
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have the important task to press for clarifications and modifications of existing WTO 
rules, which would lead to an environmentally more friendly next round of trade nego-
tiations. After the disaster of the WTO Ministerial meeting in November 1999 in Seattle 
all negotiations are blocked for the time being. But the current stalemate will be over-
come sooner or later. It is then that environmental and other NGOs will face a more im-
portant battle, which needs to be won. 
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1
 The reader should note that this result represents a possibility, but is not robust to changes in the 
specification of the model. More comprehensive models are ambiguous with respect to whether trade 
liberalisation increases global pollution (see Copeland and Taylor 1997). 
2
 This result depends on firms competing in quantities with each other (so-called Cournot competi-
tion). If instead they compete with each other in prices (so-called Bertrand competition), then profits from 
international markets can be reaped in charging higher prices. Governments have then the incentive to set 
stronger than optimal environmental standards, which allows firms to commit to higher price setting. 
3
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing my attention to this important aspect. 
4
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention on this aspect. 
5
 The relevant passage reads as follows: ‘In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, 
a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent 
information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.’ 
6
 In this respect, VanGrasstek’s (1992) empirical finding that linking trade with environmental 
issues fosters support for import restrictions in the US Congress is interesting. More research in this area 
is clearly warranted. 
